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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
MIRROR SELF-RECOGNITION IN A GORILLA (GORILLA GORILLA GORILLA)
by
Melinda R. Allen
Florida International University, 2007
Miami, Florida
Professor Bennett Schwartz, Major Professor
Psychologists have studied self-recognition in human infants as an indication of
self-knowledge (Amsterdam, 1972) and the development of abstract thought processes.
Gallup (1970) modified the mark test used in human infant work to examine if non-
human primates showed similar evidence of mirror self-recognition. Chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pygmnaeus) pass the mirror self-recognition test with
limited mirror training or exposure. Other species of primates, such as gorillas and
monkeys, have not passed the mirror test, despite extensive mirror exposure and training
(Gallup, 1979). This project examined a gorilla (G. gorilla gorilla) named Otto in the
traditional mark test. Using the modified mark-test, there were more incidents of touching
the marked area while Otto was in front of the mirror than when he was not in front of the
mirror. These results indicated that Otto was able to show some evidence of self-
awareness.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION........ ................................. 1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................. 2
III. M ETH O D O LO G Y ..................................................................... 8
S ubject.................................................................................. . . 8
Materials................................................... 8
P rocedure ................................................................ ............ 9
Behavioral Measurements........................ ........................ ......... 10
IV . R E SU L T S ...................................................... 13
N on-M irror Behaviors ................................................ ............ 13
Mirror-Directed Behaviors........................................................... 14
Contingent and Mirror-Guided Behaviors...................... ..... ..........14
Mark-Directed Behaviors............................................................ 14
V . D ISC U SSIO N .............................................................................. 16
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................18
APPENDICES................................................................................................................. 21
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Psychologists have studied self-recognition in human infants as an indication of
self-knowledge (Amsterdam, 1972) and the development of abstract thought processes.
Gallup (1970) modified the mark test used in human infant work to examine if non-
human primates showed similar evidence of mirror self-recognition. Chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) pass the mirror self-recognition test with
limited mirror training or exposure. Other species of primates, such as gorillas and
monkeys, have not passed the mirror test, despite extensive mirror exposure and training
(Gallup, 1979). This project examined a gorilla (G. gorilla gorilla) named Otto in a mark
test. Using the modified mark-test we found more incidents of touching the marked area
while Otto was in front of the mirror than when he was not in front of the mirror. These
results indicate that Otto was able to show some evidence of self-awareness.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Self-recognition has been extensively studied in infants and young children
(Courage & Howe, 2002; Amsterdam, 1972). This ability is assessed by observing the
infant's behavior in the presence of mirrors and by performance on a mark test. In the
mark test, the infant is marked unobtrusively with rouge (Asendorf, Warkentin, &
Baudonniere, 1996), paint (Courage, Edison, & Howe, 2004), or a post-it-note (Rochat,
2003) on the child's head and face, so that the child is unable to detect the mark by non-
visual cues. An observer watches to see if the infant or young child moves to touch the
mark while the child looks in the mirror. If the child reaches for the image in the mirror,
it is thought that the child does not possess an understanding of self and sees the
reflection as another individual. If, however, the child reaches for the mark on the child's
own face, it is concluded that the child possesses some knowledge of self as revealed by
recognizing the image in the mirror as being associated with the self.
The ability to recognize one's self in the mirror emerges at around eighteen
months of age (Rochat, 2003), and self-reflection contingencies appear to emerge as early
as 8 months of age (Courage, et al, 2004). According to Asendorpf et al. (1996),
recognition of the self is one of the first important elements of early cognitive
development. Mirror self-recognition (MSR) emerges as other cognitive changes are
occurring, such as "language, symbolic play, deferred imitation, object permanence,
empathy, altruism, [and] self-evaluation," enabling the young child to integrate
information from multiple sources and construct an understanding of the outside world
(Courage et al., p. 510).
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Rochat (2003) argued that before infants can identify themselves in the mirror
they must first pass through the lower levels of self-awareness. At first infants are not
aware that the mirror image is a reflection of self; rather, it is seen as an extension of the
individual's environment. To move from this level, the infants must learn through
experience to differentiate self from the environment and have experienced
contingencies. After the infants are competent at differentiating self from the
environment and learning contingencies, they will be able to identify themselves in the
mirror and be able to pass a mark test.
Mirror self-recognition is used in nonhuman primate species as an indicator of
emerging self-knowledge. Comparing infant self-recognition capabilities to those of non-
human primates may indicate that similar cognitive capabilities and structures are present
in all those who share the same these capabilities. These levels of self-awareness
described by Rochat (2003) can be seen in non-human primates as well. According to a
review by Gallup (1979), macaques, spider monkeys, baboons, and gibbons (see also
Ujhelyi, Merker, Buk, & Geissmann, 2000; Hyatt, 1998) treat their reflected image as an
extension of their environment. Gallup (1970) found that when first presented with a
mirror, chimpanzees treat the reflected image as a conspecific, i.e. an extension of their
environment. After the chimpanzees become more familiar with the mirrored image, they
began testing contingencies. Only after passing through these levels were chimpanzees
able to pass the mark test.
Monkeys are able to differentiate self from the environment and use mirrors to
solve problems through experience and training (Anderson, 1986; Brown, McDowell &
Lobinson, 1965; Itakura, 1987). Apes can also use mirrors to solve problems and guide
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behaviors (Nicholson & Gould, 1995). These results indicate that anthropoid primates
have the ability to learn contingencies and differentiate self from the environment.
However, only the great apes, (chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans) have shown
evidence of passing the mark test, indicating the highest level of self-awareness (Gallup,
1970, 1979; Lethmate & DUcker, 1973; Suarez & Gallup, 1981).
Gallup (1970) devised a method to examine self-recognition in nonhuman
primates by modifying the classic mark test previously utilized with infants. After
interacting with a mirror, the animal is anesthetized and marked on the face. When the
animal recovers from the anesthesia the mirror is reintroduced and mark-directed
behaviors are recorded. Gallup found that, initially, chimpanzees show social behaviors
(e.g. treating the mirror as a conspecific) towards the mirror. After the social behaviors
cease, self-directed behaviors (looking at self, staring at face, manipulating the mouth,
etc.) begin. Chimpanzees who showed evidence of using mirrors to direct their behaviors
were anaesthetized and marked with dye or paint on the eyebrow ridge. After recovering
from the anesthesia, self-recognition was measured by the number of touches to the
marked area. Using this procedure, Gallup argued that given sufficient exposure to
mirrors, chimpanzees were able to pass the mark test and that this was evidence of self-
recognition.
Since that initial research, there have been numerous studies that have likewise
indicated self-recognition in chimpanzees (Lin, Bard, & Anderson, 1992; Gallup &
Povinelli, 1993), and orangutans (Lethmate & Ducker, 1973; Suarez & Gallup, 1981).
The results for gorillas are not as decisive, with only two gorillas showing evidence of
self-directed behaviors in the presence of mirrors (Koko and King, Patterson & Cohn,
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1994; Swartz & Evans, 1994). These two gorillas were living in an enriched environment
with extensive human contact. These enriched conditions may have provided the
necessary experiences that would lead to a positive response on a MSR task. Both Koko
and King seemingly passed the mark test, but the data did not go through peer review nor
were the experiments performed with experimentally blind experimenters. Current
research, therefore, is ambiguous in indicating if gorillas are able to pass the mark test.
Povinelli and Cant (1995) suggest that one reason there has been failure to find
evidence of self-recognition in gorillas is that the cognitive processes responsible for self-
concept were changed by evolutionary adaptation so that they are not normally exhibited
in the general population. Povinelli and Cant contend that the foundations of self-concept
were developed to ensure survival in an arboreal lifestyle. The authors propose that the
cognitive processes responsible for self-concept may have been sacrificed and modified
when rapid physical growth was accepted to adapt with an increasingly terrestrial
lifestyle. Changes in ontogeny can have a significant impact on selection pressures and
the eventual evolution of the species, hence developmental mechanisms, genetic, and
environmental influences produce phenotypic variation that selection might then act upon
(Bjorkland, 2006).
According to the enculturation hypothesis (Call & Tomasello, 1996) being reared
in a species-atypical environment can lead to changes in that species' cognitive abilities
(Bering, 2004; Bjorkland, 2006; Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001; Tomasello et al, 1993).
Probabilistic epigenesis predicts that there is flexibility in what cognitive structures have
the potential to become. Great apes have large brains, and great flexibility in the
formation of cognitive processes. In the great apes the enculturation hypothesis suggests
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that being raised in an enriched, human-like, environment will change the ape's cognition
to resemble more closely the cognition of humans (Bering, 2001; Call & Tomaselllo,
1996; Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2001; Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001). This may
occur because the caretakers treat the captive raised apes as intentional agents, which
influences their social cognition.
A second issue limiting the findings of self-recognition in gorillas may be
aversion to eye-to-eye gazing. Gorillas consider direct eye contact a threat, which leads
them to avoid eye-to-eye gazing (Shillito, Gallup, and Beck, 1999). They argue further
that when in the presence of mirrors, gorillas may avoid eye contact and therefore not
gain enough experience with their reflection to recognize themselves during a mark test.
To address this issue, angled mirrors have been used to reduce direct eye contact.
Changing the position of the mirrors did not increase positive results (Roeder, 1989;
Shillito et al, 1999).
Nicholson and Gould (1995) addressed this issue by including training for a
mirror-mediated object discrimination task before administering the MSR task. The
authors hypothesized that the additional training to locate objects only visible by using a
mirror would allow the gorilla sufficient opportunity to overcome the gaze aversion and
learn mirror contingencies. It was also supposed that this training would increase self-
directed responses during post-training sessions. Nicholson and Gould found that a
gorilla (Muke) was able to demonstrate mirror-mediated object discrimination. This task
trained the gorilla to correctly identify the location of objects using mirror reflections.
This training facilitated an increase in self-directed behaviors in the presence of a mirror.
The authors argue that these behaviors were similar to the self-recognition behaviors
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found by Gallup. Although this study showed evidence that after specific training,
gorillas are capable of recognizing themselves in the mirror, the question as to the ability
of untrained gorillas to engage in self-directed behavior and to pass the mark test is still
unsettled.
This proposed research seeks to answer the question as to whether or not gorillas
can demonstrate self-directed behavior and pass the mark test in the presence of a mirror
without specific mirror training. A positive mark test result would indicate that the gorilla
recognizes himself in the mirror. One purpose of this research is to determine if sufficient
exposure to a mirror will facilitate a gorilla's ability to successfully pass a mark test.
Using a modified version of Gallup's mark test and a behavioral checklist derived from
Lin et al (1992), this experiment seeks to find multiple evidence of self-recognition, first
through self-directed and contingent behaviors, and then by a positive mark test result in
a lowland gorilla named Otto. Given that Otto (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) was raised in an
enriched environment, it is predicted that he will show a positive result on the mark test,
as did the other two enriched gorillas.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Subject
Otto was approximately 45 years old at the time of testing. He is a male lowland
gorilla (G. gorilla gorilla). Otto was brought to the Suncoast Primate Sanctuary in Palm
Harbor, Florida, at approximately age 2, with various health problems including
tuberculosis and septic arthritis. After recovering from his illnesses Otto was housed
individually at the Sanctuary and has been housed in an enriched environment since that
time. Otto has daily contact with various caregivers and is provided with many
enrichment opportunities, such as foraging, watching television, painting, and playing
with hula-hoops. This gorilla has not previously participated in research of any kind, nor
has he had extended exposure to mirrors; however, he has had extended human
interaction and social contact.
Otto's enclosure includes two main areas, an indoor area (his bedroom) and an
outdoor area. The bedroom has a bench near one of the sides. Otto spends much of his
time here relaxing, so this sight was chosen for placement of the mirror. Otto had full
access to both areas of his enclosure during the entire experiment.
Materials
A Canon ZR100 was used to film all sessions. The sessions were recorded onto
DVD's and sent to the university for coding. Observers KN, CB, and JM, (all FIU
undergraduates) were blind to the hypothesis and coded the behaviors. During mirror
trials, a large mirror was placed approximately 3 feet from the enclosure. Odorless,
tasteless, transparent mineral oil (approximately the same consistency of the paint used in
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test) was used during the sham trials. A non-toxic, odorless, white paint (Plaid Washable
Paint for Kids) was used for marking during the mark test. Otto's familiar trainer, DC,
performed the application of the sham and painted marks. The experimenter, MA, trained
the above coders according to a behavioral checklist, filmed all sessions, and performed
all other procedures. After the set up of each trial, the experimenter started the video
camera and left the area. The experimenter remained out of Otto's sight for the duration
of trial, insured that no other individuals interacted with Otto, and only returned when the
trial was over.
Procedure
A modification of Gallup's (1970) mark test procedure was used. It differed from
the standard procedure in that Otto was not anesthetized because of its potential health
risks. Otto progressed through four trial types: baseline, mirror exposure, sham, and test
(see appendix 1). The initial behavioral baseline was recorded by video in ten 1-hour
sessions without the presence of the mirror. These taped sessions occurred in the same
location as all other trials.
After the baseline behavior was recorded, the mirror was introduced in thirty 45-
minute sessions. At no time was Otto's attention drawn by the experimenter to look at the
mirror. These sessions were uninterrupted time in front of a plain mirror with no specific
training, in which Otto was free to examine the mirror or not. This is similar to the
familiarization procedure used by Shillito, Gallup, and Beck (1999), and provided Otto
with an adequate opportunity to become familiar with the function of a mirror.
After the mirror familiarization trials, the test trials began. The first five days of
trials were sham trials to habituate Otto to the procedure. A familiar trainer, DC,
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performed the sham marking procedure prior to the start of the session by rubbing a large
paintbrush, filled with the colorless and odorless mineral oil, along the left brow ridge.
Behaviors were recorded for 30 minutes without the mirror followed by 30 minutes in the
presence of the mirror, with the order of mirror and no mirror sessions being
counterbalanced. Sham trials were necessary to ensure that Otto was attending to the
mark and not to the novel situation of his trainer painting his brow (Anderson, 1983;
Patterson & Cohn, 1994).
After the sham trials, two paint test trials were conducted. (During the application
of the paint in test trial one, insufficient paint was applied so a third test trial was added.)
Each test trial included a session with the mirror and without the mirror. The trainer
marked the brow ridge as in the sham trials, this time with an odorless paint. Behavior
was recorded in thirty-minute sessions, first without the mirror and then followed by the
presence of the mirror, with mirror and no mirror sessions being counterbalanced. A
control trial was also conducted at the end of the experiment. The control trial followed
the same procedure as the test trials, with the inclusion of an additional mark being made
on Otto's arm.
Behavioral Measurements
The percentage of time spent in front of a mirror was recorded. To be considered
in front of the mirror, Otto had to have at least one body part on the bench located in his
bedroom. This area was directly in front of where the mirror was located. When Otto left
the bench to go to the outdoor area or the back part of his bedroom his behaviors were no
longer recorded and he was considered out of the area. The number of touches to the
marked area in both the sham and paint trials was also recorded. Mirror self-recognition
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was determined if there were significantly more touches during the test trials to the
marked area in the presence of the mirror than in the absence of the mirror.
A modification of Lin et al's (1992) behavioral checklist was also used to code
behaviors (see appendix 2). The behaviors were divided into five categories: non-mirror
behaviors, mirror-directed behaviors, contingent movements, mirror-guided behaviors,
and self-recognition. Non-mirror behaviors included face-directed behaviors, which were
acts towards the face excluding the marked area without looking in the mirror, and mark-
directed behaviors, which were acts towards the marked area without looking in the
mirror. Mirror-directed behaviors included: reaching, attempts to make physical contact
with mirror or supporting apparatus; searching, attempts to look around or behind the
mirror from an oblique angle; playing, attempts to interact with the mirror in a sociable
manner; affect display, any signs of fear or aggression towards the mirror; and looking,
gazing at the mirror without moving contingently or acting in a self-directed manner.
Contingent movements were comprised of body movements, movement of head or body
while the gorilla visually followed movements in the mirror, and facial movements,
following the movements of the face in the mirror. Mirror-guided behaviors included:
object reach, use of images in the mirror to manipulate an object; body-directed, use of
mirror images to direct action to the gorilla's own body; and face-directed, use of the
mirror to direct action to own face exclusive of the mark. Self-recognition was measured
by mark-directed behaviors, e.g. the use of the mirror to direct action to the marked spot.
Observers were first trained to code behaviors using a video of four randomly
selected segments of baseline trials, with a Pearson r of .90. The observers then coded the
remaining segments by watching the videotaped sessions and recording the number and
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duration of the behaviors on a behavioral checklist. Each trial was broken into 15-minute
segments for coding purposes. Observers were randomly assigned to the segments that
they coded, with the stipulation that they code at least one segment for each trial, and all
observers coded all segments for the sham and test trials. Twenty-four percent of the
segments had 2 observers, and 21% of the segments had 3 observers. In segments that
had 2 or more observers, only those behaviors that were recorded by at least 2 observers
were included in the data analysis. This criterion resulted in the exclusion of 1037
behaviors, 27% of the total number, (515 of which were 'looking') from further data
analysis. Only 1 mark-directed behavior and 1 mirror-mark-directed behavior were
excluded. Overall correlation between observer's responses across all trials was r = .60.
For mark-directed and mirror-mark-directed behaviors the correlation was slightly higher
than the overall correlation, with r = .77.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Inferential statistics were used to calculate significant differences between
behaviors in the various trial types. All t-values presented here reached a significance
level ofp < .05 unless indicated otherwise.
Non-Mirror Behaviors
During baseline trials, in which there was no mirror present, the percentage of the
total time spent in non-mirror directed behaviors was distributed as follows: body
directed (45%), object directed (50%), face directed (5%). There were, on average, 32.9
object-directed behaviors per baseline trial, with an average of 33.7 seconds per behavior;
20.4 body directed behaviors, with an average of 49.02 seconds per behavior; and 7.7
face directed behaviors, with an average of 13.3 seconds per behavior.
Mirror exposure and test trials saw no difference from baseline in all non-mirror
directed behaviors. Only the object directed behaviors in the mirror-sham trials showed a
significant increase, t(43) = 2.13, from baseline behaviors. There were, on average, more
object directed behaviors in the sham trials than the mirror exposure trials, t(69.9) = 2.68.
When the sham trials were broken down into mirror and no mirror trials this effect only
remaied significant for the mirror-sham trials, t(47.3) = 2.13. There were more object
directed behaviors in the sham trials than in the test trials, t(15.9) = 2.38. There were
more object directed behaviors in the mirror-sham trials than in the mirror-test trials, t(8)
= 2.96. More face directed behaviors occurred in the mirror exposure trials than in the
mirror-sham trials, t(44.5) = 3.76. There were more face directed behaviors in the no-
mirror-test trials than the no-mirror-sham trials, t(1) = 1.28.
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Mirror-Directed Behaviors
There were no mirror-directed behaviors recorded during the baseline trials. The
percentage of the total time spent in mirror-directed behaviors during the mirror exposure
trials was distributed as follows: reaching (0%), searching (5%), playing (.1%), affect
display (.1%), and looking (95%). Because reaching, searching, playing, and affect
display comprised such a low percentage of the total behaviors they were excluded from
further analyses. There were 19.2 looking average looking behaviors per trial, with an
average duration of 6.17 seconds per trial.
There were no significant differences in the amount of looking behaviors across
all trial types.
Contingent and Mirror-Guided Behaviors
Surprisingly, there was very little contingent or mirror-guided behavior observed.
Only 14 contingent face movements, 2 contingent body movements, and 1 incident of
mirror-guided face directed behavior were observed during 30 mirror exposure trials. Lin
et al (1992) argue that developmentally, contingent behaviors must occur before self-
recognition can be achieved. This may not hold true for gorillas, as there was no evidence
of contingent behaviors, yet Otto clearly passed the mark test (see next section).
Mark-Directed Behaviors
During the mirror-present sessions of the test trials Otto engaged in 16 mirror-
mark-directed behaviors (touching the marked area of his brow), with an average of 1.4
sec/touch. In both the mirror-present and mirror-absent sessions of the sham trials there
were no mirror-mark-directed behaviors recorded. There were 10 mark directed
behaviors during the mirror-absent sessions of the test trials. Although close inspection,
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by the experimenter, indicated that Otto found the mark accidentally, when he touched a
water bottle to his face and inadvertently transferred the paint from his brow to the bottle.
All 10 touches occurred following this incident. A chi-square comparing the mirror and
no mirror session of the test and sham trials with 16 touches in the mirror-present test
trial, 10 touches in the mirror-absent test trial, 0 touches in the mirror-present sham trial,
and 0 touches in the mirror-absent sham trial resulted in significant differences, 72 (3,
N=16) = 28.05. Comparing the number of touches during the mirror-present sessions of
the test trials (16) and the number of touches during the mirror-absent sessions of the test
trials (10) yields a chi square of 72 (2, N=16)= 1.38, which did not reach significance.
However, this analysis may be misleading, as it is likely that some of Otto's response in
the mirror-absent test condition was mediated by an accidental rubbing of the paint with
his water bottle. Inspection of the videotape indicated far less precise touching of the
marked area in the mirror-absent condition than in the mirror-present condition. In the
mirror-absent trial the touches over shot the mark and were not in the center of the mark,
rather they were on the edges and just slightly above the mark, and after all touching
behavior ceased there was still a majority of the paint left. In the mirror-present trial,
touches were more often in the center of the mark, more of the paint was disturbed and
not much was left after Otto had completed inspection of the marked area. Thus, after
including the qualitative differences among touching behaviors, it was concluded that
Otto passed the mark test.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Otto showed evidence of touching the marked area during the mirror-present test
condition and not during the sham test trials. The number of touches to the marked area
has generally been accepted as a sufficient indication of self-recognition (Asendorpf et al,
1996; Gallup, 1970, 1979; Lethmate & Ducker, 1973; Rochat, 2003; Suarez & Gallup,
1981) and as the key test for determining if an organism is capable of possessing a sense
of awareness. Thus, we conclude that Otto passed the mark test and exhibited recognition
of self.
We had hoped to see evidence of contingent movements and mirror-guided
behaviors as further evidence of self-recognition. Lin et al (1992) found evidence that
self-directed and contingent behaviors precede self-recognition in chimpanzees and we
predicted that the same would be true in Otto's case. We found some evidence of self-
directed behaviors, but those behaviors were not mirror-guided and the frequency of
contingent behaviors was very small. Our data indicate that mirror-guided and contingent
behaviors may not be good indices of self-recognition in gorillas. De Veer and Van den
Bos (1999) argue that evidence of mirror-guided self-directed behaviors and response to
the mark test are both conditions that measure the same phenomenon. Thus, Otto failed to
show significant evidence of mirror-guided behaviors but still possessed a sense of self-
awareness as is evidenced by his performance on the mark test.
Gorillas' performance on the self-recognition test has not been consistent. Otto
was more likely to touch the marked area when he was in front of the mirror than when
he was not. There are arguments that those gorillas receiving extensive enrichment may
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have shown some evidence of self-recognition (Koko and King, Patterson & Cohn, 1994;
Swartz & Evans, 1994). It may be that these enriched gorillas were given experiences that
enhanced their social cognition, enabling self-recognition to be expressed (Bering, 2004;
Bjorkland, 2006; Tomasello, 2000). The results of this study suggest that latent social
cognitive abilities exist in gorillas, however enriched upbringings may be necessary for
these abilities to be exhibited.
Gallup argued that, "mirror self-recognition is impossible without a primitive
form of the capacity to become the object of one's attention, to reflect on one's own
existence, or to 'interview oneself" (Povinelli, 1994, p. 573). Self-awareness and self-
recognition require the linking of a mirror image, which is a reflection of perceived
reality, to the cognitions it represents, an abstract conception (Asendorpf et al, 1996).
Positive responses on this MSR task by Otto indicate that gorillas are capable of
conceptualizing about themselves in an abstract way, similar to the conceptualization
processes evident in human infants. Evidence of self-recognition in gorillas may indicate
the possibility of further shared cognitive processes between humans and apes.
17
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Procedure Chart
Duration
of Trial
Number (in
Condition Description of Trials minutes)
1. Baseline no mirror 10 60
2. Mirror Exposure mirror, no mark 30 45
3. Sham Trials no mirror, false mark 5 30
mirror, false mark 5 30
4. Test Trials no mirror, paint mark 3 30
mirror, paint mark 3 30
A description of the four trial types, including the number and duration of those trials.
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Behavioral Checklist
Behavioral
Categories
body directed acts towards the body without looking in the mirror
0
.$ object directed acts towards an object without looking in the mirror
E
:: face directed acts towards the face excluding the marked area
o fwithout looking in the mirror
= mark directed acts towards the marked area without looking in the
mirror
reaching attempts to make physical contact with mirror or
supporting apparatus
searching attempts to look around or behind the mirror from
oblique angle
p attempts to interact with the mirror in a sociable
o playing mneanner
E affect display any signs of fear or aggression towards the mirror
looking gazing at the mirror without moving contingently oracting in a self-directed manner
E body movement of head or body while gorilla visually
0 movements follows movements in the mirror
o 0 facial
u E movements following the movements of the face in the mirror
O W
9 object reach use of images in the mirror to manipulate an object
E c d t use of the mirror to direct action to own faceface directed exclusive of the mark
mark directed use of the mirror to direct action to the marked spot
E .
Modified behavioral checklist, originally in Lin et al (1992).
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